<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Iran's foreign policy is at one of its most critical and decisive historical junctures. The threat of war targets not only the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran but also Iran's geopolitical integrity. On one hand, the United States and the Israeli regime are threatening Iran with war, and on the other, Europe, by activating the 'Snapback Mechanism,' is warning of the risk of the reinstatement of all UN Security Council sanctions imposed before the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">These threats, whether bluffs or genuine, dictate by the logic of governance and rationality that both be taken with utmost seriousness and that all available instruments be utilized to repel them. Currently, diplomacy in its classic sense, the 'art of statecraft,' and strategy in its traditional concept, the 'art of war,' have become Iran's two principal pillars for confronting the impending threats. Among these, diplomacy, with all its overt and covert dimensions, is undoubtedly considered the most rational and least costly path for neutralizing these perils.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Alongside direct and indirect dialogues with the United States, Europe, and other influential actors, one effective diplomatic strategy is the astute utilization of rifts and maneuvering spaces that emerge as a result of great power competition or following conflicts of interest among various actors. The reality is that the clash of interests among actors in the international system, as well as competition among great powers, has always created opportunities for agency by other actors. The governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran have also demonstrated at various junctures that they are adept players in leveraging these very rifts among global powers. In the same vein, conflicts of interest among regional rivals have continuously provided space for diplomatic maneuvering and the advancement of Iran's foreign policy objectives.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Observation and monitoring of regional developments, particularly since October 7, 2023, and considering the prospect of a subsequent Trump administration in the US, point to the emergence of rifts and disagreements between Washington and Tel Aviv regarding Middle Eastern affairs. The central question is whether these disagreements are strategic and fundamental in nature, or merely reflective of a transient and tactical conflict of interests between the two allies. To find a pertinent answer to this question, one can resort to historical analysis and a comparative study of two specific time periods.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">With the outbreak of World War II, Britain, then considered one of the dominant global powers and having held the Mandate over Palestine for three decades – and also referred to as the "godfather of Israel" – decided, based on its strategic interests in the war, to reduce its support for Jewish immigrants to Palestine and instead side with the Arabs. This shift in policy towards supporting the Arabs was clearly manifested in the "1939 White Paper" – which some attribute to Churchill, although it was actually issued by the Chamberlain government. Principally, the "White Paper," published three times during the Mandate period, was formulated to determine Jewish immigration quotas and the limits of land transferable to them.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">The 1939 version of this document imposed serious restrictions on both further Jewish immigration and their acquisition of Palestinian lands, a measure that was welcomed by the Arabs but met with strong protests from the Jews. It is said that this 12-page document limited the ceiling for Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years (not the 450,000 mentioned in some inaccurate sources) and also established stringent regulations for their land acquisition, stipulating that it should not exceed one-third of Palestine's total territory.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">The fury of the Jews and Zionists over this White Paper was such that it was rumored that if the opposing side in World War II had been a power other than Hitler's fascist regime, the Jewish community, in retaliation for this document, would have entered the war against Britain.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Britain's decision to support Arab countries during World War II was, of course, rooted in its global interests and policies at that juncture. London sought to prevent an Arab alliance with the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and to preserve its vital and long-standing interests in the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, and India. Nevertheless, this very change in approach led to the estrangement and "emotional divorce" of the Zionists from Britain, pushing them towards the United States as a new patron and supporter.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Today, too, noteworthy historical similarities can be observed in the current situation. The United States has defined extensive interests for itself in the Arab world, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. Now the question is: Will these interests lead to Washington abandoning Israel and a repeat of that same "emotional divorce"? Will Israel separate its path from America and align with Europe to henceforth act as that continent's proxy force in the Middle East? Of course, it is still too early for a definitive judgment on this matter, but perhaps it can be said that the scenario of Israel's complete separation from America and its sole reliance on Europe does not possess very strong analytical and theoretical backing.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">What can be asserted with greater certainty, however, is the existence of a conflict of interests between the United States and Israel in the Middle East – a rift that Iran can exploit to reduce the level of threats against itself. But how? It appears that a strategy of strengthening Iran's relations with Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia, could create a "multi-win game" for Tehran. One of the achievements of this approach would be the optimal utilization of this very conflict of interests between the US and Israel to Iran's advantage. Under the current circumstances, improving and developing Iran-Saudi relations entails significant advantages for Iran, including:</p> <ol dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;"> <li>Activating the Saudi lobby in the US in favor of regional peace: Developing relations with Saudi Arabia would galvanize this country's lobby in the United States towards dispelling the specter of war from the region.</li> <li>Encouraging the US towards a balanced agreement with Iran: This improvement in relations would steer Washington towards achieving a mutually agreeable accord with Tehran.</li> <li>Postponing or moderating Saudi-Israeli normalization: The process of normalizing Saudi relations with Israel – which itself could be considered a profound challenge, akin to "another October 7th," and alter the balance of power in the Islamic world to Iran's detriment – would be postponed for a considerable period or at least moderated.</li> <li>Challenging Israeli designs against Iran: This would pose a serious challenge to the Israeli regime's plans to create an artificial dichotomy between Iran and the Arabs, as well as its project of marginalizing or rendering Iran "irrelevant" in the region's political and economic arrangements.</li> <li>Enhancing stability in the Persian Gulf and endogenous regionalism: Expanding relations with Saudi Arabia, if founded on a stable basis of shared domestic interests, regional geopolitical realities, and the imperatives of the international system, would lead to enhanced stability in the Persian Gulf and ultimately foster elements of endogenous regionalism.</li> <li>Facilitating neighborhood policy and unleashing Iran's capacities: Developing ties with Saudi Arabia would facilitate the advancement of Iran's neighborhood policy with other Arab countries and would more actively and dynamically enable our country's potential political and economic capacities at the regional level.</li> </ol> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, Senior Expert, Center for Political and International Studies.</p> <p dir="ltr"><b><i>  (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)</i></b></p>