Irans New Foreign Policy Strategy: The Linkage and Synergy of Diplomatic Files
The recent visit by Seyed Abbas Araghchi Irans Deputy Foreign Minister and a senior member of its nuclear negotiating team to the two key regional capitals of Cairo and Beirut is of high importance. This trip conducted just before the sixth round of negotiations with the United States pursued specific objectives within Irans foreign policy.
The recent visit by Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister and a senior member of its nuclear negotiating team, to the two key regional capitals of Cairo and Beirut is of high importance. This trip, conducted just before the sixth round of negotiations with the United States, pursued specific objectives within Iran's foreign policy.
During his visit to Cairo on Monday, Araghchi met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the country's Foreign Minister. In these political discussions, in addition to reviewing bilateral relations, important topics such as the situation in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, Red Sea security, and the latest status of Iran's nuclear negotiations were subjects of discussion and exchange of views. The primary goal of these consultations was to garner support and align positions with key regional actors to strengthen Iran's hand at the negotiating table with the United States.
Egypt, despite the lack of full diplomatic relations with Iran, traditionally plays a significant role in mediation and facilitating regional communications. In this context, the visit fuels speculation about the potential involvement of Cairo in the bargaining between Iran and the United States, especially given that Egypt is a close U.S. ally in the region.
Furthermore, although the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently emphasized that nuclear negotiations should not be tied to regional issues, Iran's new regional policy is to advance the nuclear agreement in parallel with political understandings with key regional players—including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt—who harbor concerns about the security implications of Iran's nuclear program. In this regard, the visit to Cairo, following the Foreign Minister's visits to Riyadh and Ankara, appears to be an effort to manage these concerns or, at a minimum, to signal that Iran is not oblivious to the regional dimensions of the negotiations and is striving to shape a cooperative, non-zero-sum game in the region.
Significantly, on the sidelines of his meetings during the official visit to Egypt, Araghchi also met with Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (The meeting with Grossi was not arranged by Iran but was requested by Grossi through an Egyptian initiative.) The meeting between Araghchi and Rafael Grossi in Cairo is significant in itself. The choice of Cairo as the venue for this meeting, rather than Vienna or Tehran, indicates several key points. Primarily, it seems that with this move, Iran is likely seeking to send a signal of its readiness for engagement and de-escalation with the IAEA in a less formal atmosphere, away from the direct pressures of the nuclear negotiations.
The recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), expressing concern over the acceleration of Iran's 60% enrichment in the midst of negotiations with the United States, is a meaningful political signal. The timing of this report's release reinforces the analysis that the IAEA Director General and the European Troika (E3) have showcased their discontent at being sidelined from the core of the nuclear discussions.
In response to this atmosphere, the meeting between Iran's Foreign Minister and Rafael Grossi in Egypt was a diplomatic move with multiple objectives. On one hand, this meeting was an effort to re-emphasize the central and supervisory role of the IAEA. On the other, it was a shrewd move to pave the way for future understandings and resolve existing ambiguities.
Meanwhile, the visit of Deputy Minister Araghchi to Lebanon holds particular significance at a time when relations between the two countries have undergone fundamental changes. These changes have occurred in the shadow of developments following the war between Lebanon and the Israeli regime, the martyrdom of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and the election of a new president and prime minister.
At the current juncture, a major obstacle has been placed in the path of expanding Lebanon-Iran relations. This is due to Beirut's dependence on the United States to control attacks by the Israeli regime on Lebanese territory, combined with pressure from European parties who have conditioned their participation in Lebanon's reconstruction on the disarmament of Hezbollah and a significant reduction of Iran's presence in the country. Consequently, new Lebanese officials, citing their country's need for stability and reconstruction, are inclined to maintain relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran at a managed level. In this context, the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Lebanon appears to be an attempt to thwart these pressures and prevent a complete chilling of Iran-Lebanon relations. In other words, Iran's foreign policy apparatus is striving to maintain its positive connection with this small but important Middle Eastern country by preserving diplomatic ties and emphasizing economic cooperation and the issue of Lebanon's reconstruction.
Furthermore, recent developments in the region, including Lebanon's internal crises, the situation in Gaza, and the transformations in Syria, necessitate continuous consultations for Iran. These visits provide an opportunity to coordinate positions and examine the conditions for cooperation.
The recent travels of Iran's Foreign Minister can be analyzed from four key perspectives, which collectively illuminate the country's new diplomatic strategy:
First, the linkage and synergy of portfolios: Instead of focusing on a single issue, the diplomatic apparatus is seeking to create a link between the nuclear file and regional issues to advance the nation's interests on both fronts in a coordinated manner.
Second, a demonstration of maneuverability: The selection of diverse diplomatic destinations indicates Iran's flexibility and its effort to utilize its full capacity in the foreign policy arena.
Third, paving the way for an agreement: A significant objective of these diplomatic movements is to build regional trust and resolve technical obstacles with the IAEA, thereby smoothing the path toward achieving a favorable nuclear agreement.
Fourth, sending strategic messages: These visits serve as an opportunity for Iran to simultaneously send messages of its seriousness in negotiations and its insistence on national interests to both allies and rivals.
In summary, this multi-layered strategy demonstrates that on the eve of a new round of negotiations, Iran is adopting a comprehensive outlook on developments and leveraging all its diplomatic tools to manage crises and advance its strategic objectives.
Mohammad Mahdi Mazaheri University Professor
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)