The Blue Homeland Doctrine of Turkey

The Blue homeland doctrine(MaviVatan) was expressed for the first time in the symposium “ The Black Sea and Marine Security” by Admiral Gem Gurdeniz on June ۱۴, ۲۰۰۶, and then was completed by Admiral CihatYayaci by drawing the territorial waters boundaries, continental shelf and Turkey’s exclusive economic region in the black sea, Marmara sea, Aegean sea and the Mediterranean measuring an area of ۴۶۲ thousands square kilometers. The purpose of this doctrine, in addition to drawing the territorial waters of Turkey, was to determine Turkey’s strategy in the sea territories and develop a military-industrial compound for this strategy.
23 November 2020
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Jalaleddin Namini Mianji

The Blue homeland doctrine(MaviVatan) was expressed for the first time in the symposium “ The Black Sea and Marine Security” by Admiral Gem Gurdeniz on June 14, 2006, and then was completed  by Admiral CihatYayaci by drawing the territorial waters boundaries, continental shelf and Turkey’s exclusive economic region in the black sea, Marmara sea, Aegean sea and the Mediterranean measuring an area of 462 thousands square kilometers. The purpose of this doctrine, in addition to drawing the territorial waters of Turkey, was to determine Turkey’s strategy in the sea territories and develop a military-industrial compound for this strategy.

Imposing strict limits on Turkey in the Aegean sea and to some extent in the Mediterranean began since the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, continuing in later treaties, including the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. These agreements deprived Turkey of many of the islands in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. For example, the Meis island 10 Kms off the Turkish shore and 580 Kms away from Greece was given to Athens. Ankara never managed to digest this injustice. The blue homeland doctrine is, in fact, in reaction to these imposed limitations whichhas come to the surface by emergence of the Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey.

Since the blue homeland doctrine is, in itself, aggressive and contrary to the primary approach of the AK party government which was based on “ Zero problems with Neighbors”, therefore, at first, it was not taken seriously (even its theorist was imprisoned) , but following the Arab spring developments that caused the AK party government to change its interactional approach and substitute it with aggressive approaches in its foreign policy as well as the increasing importance of fossil fuel reserves in the seas, especially discovery of natural gas reserves in the east Mediterranean , the doctrine was put on the agenda of the AK party government after a decade. Turkey believes the 1920 Treaty of Sevres has trampled on its continental shelf rightsespecially in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, so the Blue Homeland Doctrine aims at bringing back those rights.

To implement its blue homeland doctrine in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas, Turkey needed ground capabilities. While Turkey previously carried out seismographic activities in the undisputed areas in the sea via international companies, the Erdogan’s government put investments in a military-industrial compound with national capabilities on its agenda. Building three seismographic ships named the Oruch Reis, Barbaros and Yavouzas well as two drilling ships named the Fatih and the Kanuni in the recent years , along with growing presence and the navy activities in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean are among Turkey’s actions in this regard. Militarily, on February 2019, Turkey held wide marine drills named”MaviVatan” with participation of 117 ships and a large number of fighter jets in the Aegean and Mediterranean. These drills which were the largest in Turkish history , showcased its tough stance by dependence on its military superiority, sending a special message to Athens, Cyprus and the European Union that Turkey is insistent on the executing of its blue homeland doctrine and imposing its governance across the depicted  marine territories.

The key question in the execution of the blue homeland doctrine was Turkey’s seismographic activities and discovery operations in the exclusive economic region depicted in the abovementioned doctrine in Turkey’s surrounding seas. There was no problem in this regard in the black sea. The marine borders of Turkey and the related exclusive economic zones in the black sea are already drawn andaccepted by the countries situated in this zone and Turkey is carrying out its seismographic research in the region. According to Ankara’s claims, the seismographic activities in the black sea has reached results by discovering a gas field (namedSakarya) with a reserve of 405 billion cubic meters. Tukey’s main problem is the execution of the blue homeland doctrine in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas. Borders drawn by Turkey in the Aegean and Mediterranean overlap those claimed by Cyprus and Greece. Athens believes its islands are the starting point for determining the exclusive economic zone. But Ankara opposes this approach and sees its result as Turkey losing a large portion of its exclusive economic zone in the Aegean and Mediterranean and being surrounded inside thegulf of Antalya. Referring to certain international procedures (including the UK and France agreement for determining their exclusive economic zones between themselves) Tukey believes the starting point for determining the exclusive economic zone must be the coastline of the mainland ( not the islands). Also, Ankara is of the opinion that the justice principle mandates that because Turkey enjoys the vastest coast in the Mediterranean (1972 Kms) is entitled to the largest exclusive economic zone in this sea. This is while there are hundreds of Greek islands inside Turkey’s claimed exclusive economic zone. Greece prefers to settle the differences through international bodies such as the Justice Tribunal  but Ankara is afraid of the results of such an action and supports a bilateral solution.

The problem in execution of the blue homeland doctrine gets thornier when it comes to Cyprus. Turkey has not recognized the country  , and only, recognizes the northern part of Cyprus as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Also, Turkey considers itself as the custodian and defender of the rights of the Turks of Cyprus, including in the exclusive economic zone  in the eastern Mediterranean ( according to the international law part of the Republic of Cyprus). The result of this policy on the ground is preventing Cyprus from gas discovery activities in the northern waters of Cyprus , sometimes by way of force. For example, in the beginning of 2018 Turkey’s warships prevented a ship belonging to the Italian company ENI from operating in the northern waters of Cyprus. In addition to this, Cyprus and Greece are members of the European union and problems with these countries automatically translate into problems with the European union. Europe has many times accused Turkey of trespassing the marine zones of Cyprus and Greece, and in case of Turkey continuing its actions, has put sanctions against Ankara  on its agenda. It is to be added that while the other countries have managed to discover gas fields in their exclusive economic zones, Turkey’s discovery activities have as of yet not brought on any result.

Today , the blue homeland doctrine , in the form of Turkey’s seismographic operations in the eastern Mediterranean , has become a basic  point of contention in the foreign policy of Turkey. Ankara, in this dispute, has the sole backing of the fragile government of Siraj in Libya , and in this relation has signed with himtwo cooperation documents on November 27, 2019, including “ delineation of the two countries competence  in the Mediterranean sea”  and “ military and security cooperation between the two countries”. These efforts meant to break through Turkey’s diplomatic isolationin the eastern Mediterranean sea, have not been taken seriously by other countries. These countries including Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, the European union and to some extent Jordan and Italy as well as countries outside the region such as France and the US( whose companies according to an agreement with Cyprus are still busy discovering gas resources) have opposed Turkey. The result of this confrontation, has been keeping Turkey out of the existing establishment among the Mediterranean states titled “ The Eastern Mediterranean Energy Assembly”. Egypt has a key role in this dispute and Ankara’s agreement with Cairo on division of the exclusive economic zone in the eastern Mediterranean can ease some of the pressure on Turkey, but Turkey’s approach toward the Muslim brotherhood not only does prevent Cairo from interacting with Ankara but also has driven Egypt toward signing agreements with Cyprus and  Greece on the exclusive economic zone between them which overlaps with the region claimed by Turkey. Saudi Arabia and the UAE in line with their anti-muslimbrotherhood  approach , openly back Egypt against Erdogan.

The blue homeland doctrine has opened a new front in the Aegean and Mediterranean( along with three other fronts in Syria, Libya and Karabach) for Turkey. Erdogan’s effort to turn the blue homeland doctrine into a matter of sovereignty and honor has caused the Turkish public to support its execution. At present, Ankara tries ,parallel with diplomatic activities, to show its political will and power on the ground to put pressure on the US and the EU to persuade Athens and Nicosia to give concessions to Turkey. An effort so far not only fruitless but also there can be seen no clear landscape for. Meanwhile, by continuation of their discovery operations , especially in case of discovery of gas in the disputed region,  the risk of limited military confrontation between  Turkey and Greece is not rejected. This issue has worried Nato  and made the organization to hold numerous meetings between Greece and Turkey to deescalate the military tension.

Positions taken by the sidesand related developments show the problem of the execution of Turkey’s blue homeland will not be easily solved  and it requires a basic change in the balance of power of the engaged sides in Ankara’s Interest.

   (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)

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