The surprising operation of October 7 by Hamas on the Zionist regime caused irreparable damage to the reputation and image of the intelligence power of this regime. The casualties and, more importantly, the blow to the reputation of the imaginary power of the Zionist regime were unprecedented in the past 50 years. An example of this amount of casualties can be found in the Kippur War of 1973.

But the war between Hamas and the Zionist regime is "acute and chaotic," which has ambiguous and complex aspects and layers. Basically, since 1948, the Palestinian issue has been complex and has many actors, both obvious and hidden, at various national, regional, and international levels. Whenever this issue reaches a critical acute point, its complexity becomes more visible than before. Based on this, a logical analysis of the Palestinian issue requires identifying short-term trends during the ceasefire period, and possible futures are drawn by observing small and large events and identifying signs of change during the crisis.

This agrees with Dawson, who said, "In times of chaos, instead of predicting, try to systematically explore possible futures." In this study, I intend to draw possible futures for the next ten days without going into crisis prediction (Basically, it is impossible to predict in the current situation due to the multitude of uncertainties) based on two assumptions, i.e., the complete occupation of Gaza or the occupation of parts of Gaza by the Zionist regime.

Before that, it is necessary to point out the major differences between this war and the past wars of the Zionist regime and the Arabs:

1. The amount of Zionist casualties in this war has been unprecedented in the past 50 years.
2. The Zionist authorities and Western analysts have acknowledged the intelligence failure of the Zionist regime.
3. Unlike in the past, the Zionist regime does not hide its casualties but on the contrary, it announces its casualties, and even more than that, it maneuvers on
4. Using the metaphor of "September 11 in the Middle East" and "another holocaust," the authorities of the Zionist regime first acknowledged their intelligence surprise. Secondly, to justify the future crimes of the Zionist army, they played an innocent role.
5. This war happened during another big war, the Ukrainian War.
6. This war happened right on the eve of the completion of the project "Normalization of relations between the Zionist regime and the Arabs," that is, the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and the Zionist regime.
7. This defeat was imposed on the Zionist regime by the first dyke of the resistance front, Hamas, and the second, third, fourth, and fifth dykes (Syria, Hezbollah, Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi, and Iran) did not participate in the war.
8. The crisis has occurred at a time when some Arab governments have agreed with the reconciliation process with the Zionist regime and the formation of two Palestinian governments and the Zionist regime.
9. The crisis is at a time when the stabilizing elements in the Middle East have a noticeable superiority over the destabilizing elements.
10. The crisis is at a time when regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have a higher hand in creating a new order in the Middle East than extra-regional powers such as America, China, and Russia.

Considering the above ten cases that make the current acute crisis "special and exceptional" compared to previous crises and assuming that the main actors involved in the crisis include the Zionist regime, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, America, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, European Union are "rational actors" that is, they make decisions based on material cost-benefit in the crisis, and they make the next decision and action with the "cybernetic model," that is, based on the feedback of each action and decision in the field, we draw possible futures for the next ten days.

1. The fear of facing the traps of Hamas in Gaza, the crisis of replacing the Hamas organization in Gaza, the increase in the casualties of the Zionist regime during the war, the fear of the reaction of the resistance front in Lebanon, and the pressure of public opinion make the Zionist regime enter Gaza in a very limited way and with the mediation of the Arab countries should release their hostages, then after their release, through airstrikes and the destruction of Gaza's infrastructure and the increase in the killing of Palestinians, the Zionist regime earns respect and agree to a ceasefire.
2. The war will be limited to Gaza; the Zionist regime enters Gaza but faces the traps of Hamas, and to preserve its prestige, it destroys all the infrastructures of Gaza, takes many times its victims, then despairs and accepts a ceasefire with the mediation of Qatar and Turkey.
3. The Zionist regime enters Gaza in a limited way, takes its victims many times, destroys the infrastructure, but does not completely occupy Gaza. Instead, in negotiations with the Arabs, it obtains political concessions such as restraining Hamas and sheltering the leaders and military planners of Hamas by the Arabs.
4. The war will be limited to Gaza; the Zionist regime occupies Gaza; it will be deployed in key areas of Gaza; it destroys the infrastructure of Gaza and administers this area from 1967 to 1994 by appointing local rulers affiliated with the Zionist regime.
5. The war will be limited to Gaza; the Zionist regime occupies Gaza; it will be deployed in key areas of Gaza; it will destroy the infrastructure of Gaza and hand over the administration of Gaza to the Palestinian National Authority with conditions.
6. After entering Gaza, the Zionist regime faced the traps of Hamas, and Hezbollah entered the conflict in the north of the Zionist regime in a limited and controlled manner. The resistance front is also activated in the West Bank. The Zionist regime is desperate on all three fronts. In the negotiations, in exchange for a security guarantee from the Arabs, it gave in to the formation of two independent Palestinian governments.
7. The scope of the war expands: Gaza is occupied by the Zionist regime, the air war with Hezbollah and Syria begins, and so on.
8. In addition to Hezbollah, the scope of the war extends to other actors. In this situation, other extra-regional actors will probably enter the war, and so on.

Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, a senior expert of the IPIS

 (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)