The complexity of political and security equations in West Asia and the plethora of uncertainties in this region have brought many political and security analyses to the verge of discredit. Therefore, validating analyses when confronting the intricate and ambiguous issues of this region has become a fundamental pillar of studies, enabling the accurate identification of current trends in West Asia and, based on that, the adoption of effective policies. Donald Trump's trip to the three countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE also comprised overt and covert layers, each worthy of consideration in its own right.

On the visible surface of this trip, we witnessed the signing of contracts worth $600 billion with Saudi Arabia, a $243 billion agreement with Qatar, and $200 billion with the UAE. Thus, Donald Trump concluded his Persian Gulf trip with total investment commitments valued at $1.4 trillion – an achievement considered unprecedented in US history, especially within the framework of a single regional tour. Other apparent aspects of this visit include the official US recognition of Ahmed al-Sharaa's government in Syria and, more importantly, the promise to lift sanctions on Syria through the mediation of Mohammed bin Salman. Furthermore, encouraging Saudi Arabia and Syria to join the Abraham Accords and efforts to create a bipolar dynamic between US-aligned Arab countries and Iran were other evident layers of this trip. However, the hidden layers of this trip are of far greater importance from an analytical perspective and for understanding future trends.

Donald Trump's visit to the Persian Gulf, with all its verbal and behavioral engagements and the series of remarkable agreements concluded between the US and the three Arab countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, subconsciously evokes ten noteworthy hidden layers in the minds of analysts:

1. This trip clearly demonstrated that the common and widely touted analysis claiming "the US is seeking to abandon the Middle East to focus on competition with China" lacks significant credibility. The reality is that while the United States has merely transformed its pattern of intervention in West Asia in recent years, it has not only not abandoned it but also harbors no intention of leaving this region. In fact, West Asia itself has become one of the main arenas of competition between the US and China – a field where we are now witnessing increasing power contestation among major powers and emerging actors. The US has only shifted its method of intervention in this region from direct presence to a strategy of "offshore balancing" by relying on its proxy forces.
2. One can no longer look at West Asia with a simplistic and monolithic view and prescribe general and universal remedies for it. The era of considering this region a homogenous entity has passed. Now, not only do current trends in the Persian Gulf subsystem fundamentally differ from developments prevailing in the Levant subsystem, but in some cases, we witness manifest contradictions between the two.
3. In the current landscape of the Persian Gulf region, the "pursuit of stability" serves as a focal point of consensus, linking all littoral states of this vital waterway and major powers like China and the US. In this context, the scales seemingly tip in favor of de-escalatory factors, with these overcoming escalatory elements. Concurrently, geo-economic and geopolitical components have also achieved a relative equilibrium through a form of balanced coexistence. The outcome of this situation is the formation of a collective will to safeguard the stability of the Persian Gulf and prevent any instability and conflict – an objective pursued not only by key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq, but also by global powers like China and even the United States. In this regard, Iran, which throughout history has always been a herald and guardian of stability and tranquility in the Persian Gulf in both theory and practice, also assesses this convergence as aligned with its own and the region's enduring interests.
4. The helm of US foreign policy is, more than anything, steered by commercial and economic priorities; hence, Washington strives to keep itself, as much as possible, from entering the quagmire of conflicts. On this basis, regarding Iran's nuclear file as well, the White House prefers to pursue the path of diplomacy to resolve challenges. The recent trip showed that pessimistic scenarios speaking of "American deception under the guise of negotiation, aimed at preparing public opinion for a war against Iran" lack a solid basis. However, it should not be overlooked that this possibility, however faint, still retains its place among a plethora of other potential options, and intelligent monitoring of its signs remains essential.
5. This trip also revealed that the eruption of any potential war between Iran and the US would face staunch opposition, especially from the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf. This reality lends further credence to speculations about secret diplomacy between Saudi Arabia and the United States aimed at reaching an agreement to resolve Iran's nuclear issue. In such an atmosphere, the scenario known as "Garcia, riding on Arab dollars" (implying Arab funding for the US military presence on Diego Garcia), significantly fades and loses credibility.
6. Furthermore, the anti-Iranian tone in Trump's statements reinforces the conjecture that hoping for the complete lifting of economic sanctions on Iran in any potential future agreement is an overly optimistic view. It appears the likely strategy in upcoming negotiations will be based on the "less for less" principle. This means that if an agreement is reached, the United States will probably take the military option against Iran's nuclear facilities off the table, prevent Israeli military action against these facilities, and, in the first step, content itself with lifting only some of the less effective sanctions. Thereafter, Washington would express willingness to lift other sanctions in exchange for further steps by Iran and within the framework of dialogues concerning regional, missile, political, and human rights issues.
7. This trip demonstrated that the US and the Zionist regime are not in full agreement on issues related to the West Asia region and that differences exist between them. These differences could also pertain to Iran-US negotiations. The positive aspect of this disagreement for Iran is that the US may not fall into the trap of war against Iran. Its negative aspect is that Israel, after a potential Iran-US agreement, might unilaterally disrupt the situation and, in a covert alliance with a few European countries, carry out acts of sabotage or assassination without claiming responsibility.
8. This trip increased Saudi Arabia's weight in the future political, security, and economic equations of the region. Firstly, it showed that Saudi Arabia has influence in Syria comparable to Turkey's. Secondly, it indicated that under a Trump administration, Saudi Arabia and the Israeli regime are the most important US allies in the region. Thirdly, it affirmed Saudi Arabia's prominent position in Iran-US nuclear negotiations.
9. Trump's statements and his targeted comparisons between the Iran of the past and present, as well as the past and present of Arab countries, clearly showed his sinister intelligence and diabolical skill in waging psychological warfare. These remarks provoked exactly the reaction from the Islamic Republic's officials that Trump, with his particular shrewdness, sought to achieve.
10. Finally, Trump's trip to the region and the series of actions and reactions that followed once again made it clear that West Asia is still shrouded in a thick fog of uncertainties. Therefore, it is anticipated that the triad of "complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty" will continue to weave the main fabric of political and security issues in this region in 2025 as well.

Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini; Senior Expert, Center for Political and International Studies