France has long been a driving force in the discourse on European security. In the late 2010s and early 2020s, roughly coinciding with the first Trump presidency, Paris began to more assertively and openly articulate and pursue its ideas about playing a significant role in guaranteeing the continent's security and achieving European strategic autonomy. To realize its ideas, France took two main actions:

• Activating Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty (The EU's Mutual Assistance Clause)

Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France called on EU members to invoke Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, also known as the EU's mutual defence clause. This article obligates member states to provide aid and assistance to any member state that is the victim of armed aggression. This was the first time a member state had requested the implementation of this article since the Lisbon Treaty came into force (December 1, 2009). Although the article does not automatically mandate military intervention, it requires member states to provide the victim with all possible means and tools of assistance, which can include military support if necessary. Consequently, member states responded to France's call with various forms of support, ranging from political solidarity to intelligence sharing and operational counter-terrorism cooperation.

• Proposing the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in 2018

The European Intervention Initiative is a joint military initiative among 13 European countries that operates outside of existing structures like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The initiative was first proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne speech in September 2017. On June 25, 2018, nine NATO members signed a letter of intent to launch the initiative. Finland joined the plan on November 7, 2018. In December 2022, the annual meeting of the group, comprising 13 countries—France, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy—was held in Norway.

The primary objectives for which this initiative was formed are:

1. Ensuring compatibility of the coalition with the EU and NATO.
2. Achieving a shared perspective on security concerns.
3. Deploying liaison officers.
4. Pursuing long-term efforts in defence.
5. Committing to European security operations.
6. Utilizing effective capabilities.

With the onset of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022, despite many EU countries assessing the attack on Ukrainian soil as a security threat to Europe, the mechanism proposed by France (the European Intervention Initiative) did not take significant action. At the end of their 2022 annual meeting, the members of the EI2 merely issued a joint declaration condemning Russia's attack on Ukraine. During that period, Paris's efforts for broader engagement with its European partners in the defence and security domain were met with limited responses from European capitals, as these proposals often did not align with the national priorities of the member states. Many European governments were more focused on countering the Russian threat and collective defence within the NATO framework, which itself was structurally, financially, and militarily heavily reliant on the United States.

Trump's victory in the 2024 election and his "America First" strategy drastically increased doubts about U.S. security guarantees for Europe. The widening gap across the Atlantic, on one hand, provided an opportunity for France to once again play a significant role in the European security debate, and on the other hand, its European partners showed a greater willingness to engage in dialogue. France's proposals for defence and security cooperation cover a wide range of issues, from security guarantees for Ukraine to the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

The current welcoming attitude of European countries towards the idea of a new European defense and security architecture stems from the two following significant developments:

First: A Dramatic Shift in the Parameters of European Security in the Trump Era

A look at the past reveals that for many European governments, the concept of European strategic autonomy was seriously questioned, and they harbored significant doubts as to whether Europe should even consider a "Plan B" for its security. For most Europeans, the primary plan for European security, or "Plan A," was unequivocally the security guarantees of NATO and the role of the United States, as stipulated and enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which establishes collective defense. Any other plan or mechanism that could potentially lead to the decoupling of European security from the United States was considered a detrimental or even dangerous proposition. Therefore, any proposal or initiative that articulated a form of European strategic autonomy was assessed as an attempt to separate transatlantic security and was met with widespread opposition.

Thus, it was quite natural for France's historical approaches to European security to be interpreted and dismissed as grand Gaullist illusions or simply as anti-American and anti-NATO. In contrast, France's emphasis on strategic autonomy was based on a sober analysis of the United States and the likely future trajectory of transatlantic security relations.

Since the beginning of Donald Trump's presidency in 2017, Emmanuel Macron, based on his assessment of domestic developments in the United States and the dynamics of international trends, has insisted that the U.S. withdrawal from European security is gradual and inevitable. One assumption was that Trumpism would persist even without Trump, meaning the "America First" doctrine and isolationist tendencies would prevail in Washington's foreign policy. On the international level, the U.S.-China competition was widely seen as a key feature shaping the dynamics between great powers, with clear implications for Europe. From the French perspective, the U.S. pivot to Asia would inevitably lead to reduced engagement in European security affairs as Washington's focus shifted towards the Indo-Pacific. In short, Trump's return to power in 2024 and his administration's "Make America Great Again[1]" policies acted as a game-changer on the European stage.

Second: The Evolution of French Approaches to Security and Convergence with Eastern European Views

By the late 2000s, France had largely reconciled itself with the idea that NATO was the primary mechanism for European security. In practice, France had concluded that the traditional French ideas of a "defense of Europe" (l’Europe de la défense[2]), meaning the creation of a separate European defense identity outside the NATO framework, lacked buyers among many European countries and was unattainable. Since then, Paris has increasingly viewed the Atlantic Alliance as a valuable military tool in which France could assume a more prominent role. It was based on this understanding of Europe and transatlantic relations that Nicolas Sarkozy officially returned France to NATO's military command structure in April 2009, after a 43-year absence[3]. In his speech, he stated: "Rejoining the military command structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and ending this separation is in the interest of both France and Europe. After rejoining NATO, France will have greater power and influence, and by entering this military organization, we will have a place among our allies. Joining NATO is the end of the era of French exceptionalism and will in no way jeopardize Paris's security, independence, or defense capabilities, and we will maintain our independent nuclear deterrent."

Although Sarkozy's right-wing government distanced itself from Gaullist ideas and set aside, albeit temporarily, the pursuit of European defense independence plans, this Elysée policy was not the sole factor in the abandonment of such plans. The differing views among European countries regarding: 1) the origin of Europe's security threats, 2) their prioritization, and 3) how to confront them played a significant role in the lack of momentum for European defense and security convergence outside the NATO structure.

While NATO members officially agreed on a "360-degree approach"[4], meaning the Alliance should be prepared to respond equally to threats from all directions, European countries were divided into eastern and southern blocs when it came to defining and identifying the most direct and immediate threat. Europeans were split on whether threats from the east—primarily Russia—should be the priority, or whether threats from the south—mainly terrorism and, to some extent, organized crime and migration—were more direct and immediate. In these debates, France was an explicit and active proponent of focusing on threats from the south (terrorism originating from Salafist and extremist Islamism in African and southern Mediterranean countries), a region where it was already militarily engaged. For France, the Russian threat was not as high a priority as the threats from the southern flank. Although Paris had its own negative experiences with Moscow's actions in France's sphere of influence—for instance, Russia's behavior in Syria and increasingly in Africa—it ultimately considered the risk of a Russian aggression against French territory or any of its allies to be low. Particularly, relying on its nuclear deterrent, Paris did not feel a serious threat from Moscow. The disagreement between the southern and eastern flanks of Europe in their threat perception also had direct military consequences, such as differences in planning for collective and regional defense, and disagreements on planning for transport operations, among others.

Furthermore, due to its different assessment of the origin of threats, France had for a considerable period alienated many of its European partners with its perceived pro-Russia approach. While the countries of NATO's eastern flank warned that Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014 would not be the Kremlin's last attempt to undermine European security, France did not share this conclusion. From a military standpoint, France was rebuked and criticized for not participating in NATO's deterrence posture in a manner commensurate with its political weight. For example, as a key member, it did not contribute as it should have to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)[5]. Diplomatically, in the negotiations for the Minsk agreements, which aimed to secure a ceasefire and a political settlement in eastern Ukraine, France, along with Germany, appeared in a way that seemed to accept past events (Russia's territorial gains), a position that was not in Ukraine's interest. Macron's speech at the annual conference of French ambassadors in 2018, when he proposed a review of Europe's defense and security architecture, in some ways incorporated Russia's views. The following year, he invited Vladimir Putin for a working visit to his summer residence and shortly thereafter emphasized the need to improve relations with Russia.

In 2019, France took a step further and initiated its own bilateral strategic dialogue mechanism with Russia. In explaining the reasons for this strategic dialogue, Emmanuel Macron pointed to European interests and the belief that in the emerging multipolar international system, Russia should be offered a strategic partnership beyond France's alliance with China. Even after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Macron's positions towards Russia were still perceived as partisan by his European partners (especially the northern and eastern members of Europe), for instance, when he argued that Russia should receive security guarantees after the war ended.

In retrospect, the disagreement between France and the countries of Eastern and Northern Europe was rooted in their different assessments of the level of risk Russia posed to the European security order. Macron's call in 2022 for post-war security guarantees for Russia clearly indicates that the Élysée believed the security dilemma between Russia and the West had to be managed in some way. In contrast, from the perspective of Northern and Eastern European countries, Russia's behavior was focused on geopolitical revisionism and changing international relations.

However, from 2023 onwards, France's official discourse on Russia gradually changed, increasingly addressing the declared nature and objectives of Moscow and the threat it poses to Europe. In his speech in March 2025, Macron posed the question: "How credible is it that Russia will stop today in Ukraine? Russia has become a threat to France and Europe, now and for years to come. I deeply regret it and am convinced that in the long run, peace will return to our continent when we face a peaceful Russia, but today we are at a point where we must confront it." These remarks by Macron not only represent an admission of a previous miscalculation and an updated understanding of the Russian threat by Paris but also bring France closer to many of its partners, especially in Northern and Eastern Europe.

After the ups and downs of the last two decades and considering realities such as: 1) France's distancing from the ideology of NATO membership as the best way to secure its security interests, 2) intensified efforts to reduce Europe's security dependence on the United States, and 3) the convergence of views among EU member states on the origin and priority of the security threat, the preservation of the current trend of convergence towards achieving some form of European defense and security autonomy still hinges on the answers to two main questions:

First: Do Europeans consider the change in transatlantic relations to be permanent? Or is a return to the previous state of affairs possible after the end of the Trump era and his departure from the White House? Therefore, once again, differing analyses of the likely future path of the transatlantic link are a decisive variable in European security cooperation.

Second: Will changes in France's domestic politics not once again cause a shift in France's approach and reduce the country's motivation and energy to pursue plans for European defense and security autonomy? The current government of François Bayrou faces the constant threat of being removed by a vote of no confidence. Polls indicate that the possibility of a far-right victory in the 2027 presidential election cannot be ruled out. If the right-wing National Rally (RN)[6] party or any other populist force comes to power, the consequences for French foreign policy would likely be significant.

Alireza Ghazili, Senior Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies

 (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)

[1] Make America Great Again

[2] L’Europe de la défense: A French term for "the Europe of defense," referring to the concept of an independent European defense capability.

[3] France's NATO Withdrawal and Return: On the orders of then-President Charles de Gaulle, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command in 1966, seventeen years after NATO's founding, in protest of what he saw as American expansionism. At that time, General de Gaulle, in a letter to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, demanded that the U.S. and Canada withdraw their military forces—approximately 29,000 personnel—from French soil as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, France never left the organization itself and always remained on the sidelines as a founding, nuclear, and powerful member of the military pact. From 1949 to 1952, France hosted NATO's headquarters, which was then moved to Brussels in 1952.

[4] 360-Degree Approach: At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO established a new baseline for its deterrence and defense, consistent with a 360-degree approach across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace, and against all threats and challenges.

[5] Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP): A NATO defensive and deterrent military force in northern, central, and eastern Europe. This posture was established through Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in Northern Europe; Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary in Central Europe; and Romania and Bulgaria in Eastern Europe to protect and reassure the security of member states on NATO's eastern flank. After Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, NATO members agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit to deploy four multinational combat battalions to the areas most likely to be attacked.

[6] The National Rally (Rassemblement National - RN), known as the National Front (Front National) until 2018, is a French political party that is socially conservative, nationalist, and right-wing. In the 2024 National Assembly elections, the party succeeded in winning 124 out of 577 seats in the French parliament.