What is commonly referred to as the “rise of China”—above all its rapid economic expansion—has naturally not been confined to the country’s domestic sphere; it has also manifested itself on the international stage. In line with its global power projection, Beijing has sought to expand and deepen its presence across multiple regions, thereby reinforcing its role as a player of consequence. This growing global outlook has led scholars to inductively analyze China’s strategies toward different regions; while the Chinese government itself has articulated its regional policies through statements, speeches, and official white papers.
One region that has drawn particular attention due to its geopolitical and geoeconomic significance is West Asia (the Middle East). China’s presence in this region has been shaped by a specific vision and set of principles. Several key points must be considered when analyzing Beijing’s current relationship with West Asia.
First, under Xi Jinping—and especially following the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China’s relations with West Asian states entered a new chapter. Since assuming power in 2013, Xi has demonstrated exceptional characteristics that set him apart in the history of the People’s Republic. He is the only Chinese leader to serve three consecutive terms as both general secretary of the Communist Party and president. More importantly, at least according to Western analysts, Xi has sought to distance China from Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum “hide your strength, bide your time.” In doing so, he has positioned China as the sole rival to the United States both willing and able to challenge the liberal rules-based international order. From the perspective of theorists such as John Mearsheimer, Xi’s China seeks to construct a new international order—or at the very least, to reshape the existing one in its favor.
Second, the historical trajectory of China’s engagement with West Asia deserves emphasis. Jonathan Fulton of Zayed University has outlined a conceptual model to describe Beijing’s evolving approach: indifference (1949–1965), hostility (1966–1971), transition (1971–1991), interdependence (1990–2012), and the Belt and Road era (2013–present). During Mao’s early years, China paid little attention to a distant region such as West Asia. But as Beijing emerged as a global communist leader, it supported leftist movements, most notably the Dhofar Liberation Front. Later, with Sino-U.S. rapprochement and growing estrangement from Moscow, Beijing’s relations with West Asian states softened. After the Cold War, energy dependence and ties with U.S. regional partners pushed China to cultivate closer relationships. Under Xi and the BRI, these links expanded into strategic partnerships across the region.
Third, West Asia has gained further salience in China’s recent pivot to the “Global South.” The term generally refers to non-industrialized states, many of them former colonies. Here, Beijing enjoys a comparative advantage, having steadily built an empire of influence through infrastructure investment, financial engagement, and diplomatic and cultural initiatives. The Global South offers clear instrumental value: cultivating the goodwill and support of over 100 countries worldwide. West Asia fits neatly into this strategy, offering Beijing both symbolic and material benefits.
Energy is central to this engagement. Remarkably, until the early 1990s the Gulf—home to half of global oil reserves and 40 percent of gas—was not a priority for Beijing. China lacked diplomatic ties with several Gulf states until after 1990. Only once it became a net energy importer in 1993 did the Gulf assume critical importance. Today, as the world’s largest crude importer, China treats West Asia as an indispensable energy source, while simultaneously expanding cooperation into infrastructure, investment, and technology.
Yet despite these interests, scholars consistently ask: why has China refrained from more assertive—particularly security-oriented—engagement in West Asia? For the most part, Beijing has limited itself to mediation roles, such as brokering dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia or between Palestinian factions.
China’s regional strategy can be described as “friends with all, enemies with none.” Unlike the United States, which since the 1973 Yom Kippur War has tied its security posture to Israel, China maintains flexibility in partner choice. It buys oil from Iran while cooperating with Saudi Arabia on ballistic missile technology; invests in Syrian infrastructure while courting Turkey for BRI participation. Such balancing reflects Beijing’s preference not to jeopardize relations with one side for the sake of another. The dual signing of comprehensive strategic partnerships with both Riyadh and Tehran in 2016—and naval drills with each in 2019—illustrate this hedging approach.
Moreover, available evidence suggests that under Xi Jinping, foreign policy has assumed a lower priority relative to economic, social, and party matters. Politburo study sessions—key indicators of leadership focus—show that foreign affairs receive less attention today than under Hu Jintao. Still, as a major power, China cannot ignore external affairs; but here, its priority remains its immediate neighborhood and relations with the United States. Southeast Asia and Central Asia, because of their direct security relevance, outrank West Asia in China’s strategic hierarchy.
Domestic imperatives further constrain foreign policy. The Communist Party leadership, especially under Xi, channels much of its political capital into managing the economy, addressing social challenges, and consolidating party control. This inward focus again relegates West Asia to a secondary position.
In Beijing’s strategic geometry, therefore, West Asia and North Africa occupy a peripheral but not negligible position. They matter greatly for China’s economic growth—through energy, investment, and emerging fields such as AI and digital infrastructure—but do not rise to the level of existential security. Unlike issues such as Xinjiang, Taiwan, or the South China Sea, no West Asian actor has both the capability and intent to challenge China’s core interests. Some regional states, in fact, have lent direct or indirect support to China’s global positions. This makes the region more of an opportunity-driven arena than a threat-laden environment.
In sum, West Asia and North Africa are “important but not vital” in China’s foreign policy. Energy and economics drive most bilateral interactions, while trade, investment, and technology deepen interdependence. Yet the region lacks the capacity to pose existential threats to China’s national security or political legitimacy. Accordingly, Beijing’s approach is not one of offensive strategy but of reactive pragmatism—minimizing political and security risks while maximizing economic and diplomatic gains amid a shifting global order.
Sajad Atazadeh
Expert, Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS)

(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)