Until recently, few policy tools unified Democrats and Republicans as strongly as export controls. Restrictions on the spread of dual-use American technologies—particularly semiconductors—had become a bipartisan cornerstone of Washington’s technological competition with China and a preferred instrument to punish Russia for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Policymakers largely agreed that if sensitive technologies fell into the hands of undesirable actors, they could pose serious risks to U.S. national security. Although the two parties debated the details, there was broad consensus that the U.S. government must regulate the transfer and circulation of these technologies.
The Trump administration has also turned to export controls—but with a fundamentally different logic. In August, the administration reached an agreement with NVIDIA, a leading American semiconductor designer used in artificial intelligence applications. Under this deal, in exchange for permission to export its H20 chip to China, NVIDIA must pay 15 percent of its revenue from these sales to the U.S. government. In the past, Washington’s licensing process focused primarily on assessing potential security threats. This time, however, that process was replaced by a financial mechanism: obtaining a share of NVIDIA’s income took precedence over national security considerations.
Although Beijing responded by banning Chinese firms from purchasing NVIDIA chips—accusing the company of violating antitrust laws—the Trump administration’s move illustrates a troubling trend: the commercialization of national security. Instead of treating security as a unique and non-quantifiable public good—akin to free elections, freedom of speech, or freedom of religion—the administration has approached it as a portfolio of divisible and monetizable assets. What was once “security” has now been turned into “security stock.” Worse still, the value of these assets appears negotiable; as the president himself revealed, the government initially demanded 20 percent of NVIDIA’s revenue before settling for 15 percent.
Reducing national security to dollars and cents does not merely distort its meaning—it undermines it. Replacing export licenses with revenue-sharing agreements, conducting direct state investments in private corporations, and pressuring allies for payments may fill the Treasury’s coffers; but policies driven by short-term financial gain neither resolve old security challenges nor prevent new ones. Such an approach facilitates the transfer of sensitive technology to adversaries, weakens oversight of taxpayer resources, and erodes Washington’s capacity to shape the surrounding international order. Avoiding these risks requires a coherent and forward-looking strategy that acknowledges the United States’ actual position in today’s world. As long as the federal government operates like a business—pricing, packaging, and reselling policies—true economic security will remain out of reach.
Reaching an Understanding
From the very moment the term “national security” entered American public discourse, economic concerns were integral to its meaning. As historians Peter Rood and Andrew Preston have shown, Franklin D. Roosevelt, both during his 1932 campaign and throughout his presidency, deliberately defined national security to include threats to domestic economic welfare. In his 1933 radio address, Roosevelt emphasized that economic crises caused “incalculable social damage” and led to “a loss of the sense of security.” He described his New Deal economic reforms as “essential to national security” and later summed it up with the line: “Freedom from fear has always been linked to freedom from want.”
Over time, Roosevelt’s conception gave way to a broader and increasingly militarized understanding—reinforced by the rise of the defense industry and the emergence of the military-industrial complex. The Cold War’s focus on military and ideological rivalry dominated U.S. strategic thinking well into the 21st century. Even after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington continued to interpret national security largely through a militarized lens, albeit now employing financial and technological tools to counter terrorist networks and “rogue” regimes.
In the 2010s and early 2020s, however, Roosevelt’s economic dimension of national security reemerged—this time with bipartisan consensus. The Obama administration’s 2015 National Security Strategy stated that “America’s economic strength is the foundation of our national security.” Donald Trump echoed that sentiment during his first term, declaring upon the release of the 2017 National Security Strategy: “For the first time, the United States’ strategy explicitly acknowledges that economic security is national security.”
Four years later, President Joe Biden reaffirmed the same principle in his 2021 Interim National Security Guidance, asserting that “economic security is national security.” Under Biden, the Department of Commerce assumed an unprecedentedly central role in national security policy—not only in export control, but also in supply chain resilience, cybersecurity, critical technologies, climate policy, investment review, law enforcement, trade diplomacy, intellectual property, domestic investment, and even commercial space policy.
Across these areas, bipartisan agreement has been striking. Republicans, in particular, supported the Department of Commerce’s assertive stance on export control. In late 2023, Republican presidential candidate Ron DeSantis even proposed the creation of a “Federal Office of Economic Security and Competitiveness,” mirroring several institutions that the Biden administration had already established that year—such as the “Supply Chain Center” and the “Office of Economic Security and Emerging Technologies.”
This alignment was more than institutional. It reflected a philosophical convergence: both parties accepted that security was not merely the absence of military attack but also the mitigation of economic vulnerabilities. Economic security became both a domestic and an international concern. The erosion of strategic industries, loss of technological superiority, and dependency on foreign supply chains all made the United States more susceptible to external coercion. The COVID-19 pandemic vividly demonstrated how disruptions in global supply networks could jeopardize access to vital goods. Although Democrats and Republicans diverged on tactics, both agreed on the diagnosis: the United States must integrate its economic and security strategies.
Everything Has a Price
The second Trump administration has upended this bipartisan consensus. Traditionally, national security policy aimed to mitigate threats; now it seeks to profit from them, on the assumption that monetization will ultimately reduce taxes and benefit the public. The H20 chip deal with NVIDIA epitomizes this approach: a company previously identified as a potential security risk is now permitted to “buy off” that risk through payment. Trump has argued that the chips are outdated and that China “already has them,” implying that exports pose no danger. Yet under U.S. law (Title 50 of the U.S. Code), paying for export licenses is explicitly prohibited, precisely to prevent financial interests from overriding security concerns. When export control is monetized, national security itself becomes negotiable.
Legal constraints have not stopped the administration. A similar agreement was reached with AMD, which agreed to pay 15 percent of its Chinese revenue to the U.S. government—a deal Treasury Secretary Scott Bassent described as a “beta test.” Such arrangements may proliferate, extending beyond export control to foreign investment approval and defense contracting. But when money replaces oversight, the risks to national security multiply rather than diminish.
The commercialization of security is not confined to revenue-sharing. The administration has also begun investing directly in American corporations. In August, Washington announced the purchase of a 10 percent stake in Intel—worth $8.9 billion—making the government both regulator and shareholder. While the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 had already authorized grants to Intel under strict public-interest conditions, equity investment transforms the relationship entirely. It grants immediate liquidity but weakens public accountability, allowing strategic firms to operate with reduced scrutiny.
The administration’s transactional approach extends further—to defense and foreign aid. As President Trump declared in 2024, “Taiwan must pay for its own defense. We’re no different from an insurance company.” Taipei soon pledged to increase its arms purchases, and other allies came under similar pressure. The same logic guided Washington’s agreement with Kyiv over critical minerals, effectively monetizing continued U.S. support for Ukraine’s war effort. Simultaneously, traditional development aid was curtailed, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio announcing a shift from a “charity-based model” to “investment opportunities” with “multiplier effects” for private capital.
When Security Becomes a Commodity
Equating foreign aid and defense commitments with commercial transactions ignores their strategic value. Beyond their humanitarian rationale, such policies serve as stabilizers against the spread of extremism, criminal networks, and rival influence. They prevent the very crises that later demand costly intervention. Yet under the logic of monetization, their worth is measured only by immediate returns. The administration’s “profit-seeking” vision thus represents more than transactionalism—it reflects a philosophical shift in which intangible security benefits are exchanged for tangible cash flow.
At best, this orientation distracts Washington from solving real security problems; at worst, it exacerbates them. Commercializing security can even invite new vulnerabilities by encouraging wealthy private or foreign actors to buy influence. The 400-million-dollar “gift” of a luxury aircraft from Qatar to the U.S. president illustrates how monetized politics creates opportunities for espionage and corruption.
The deeper contradiction lies in the conflict between profit and protection. Economic security means safeguarding the national economy, critical infrastructure, and public welfare—enhancing resilience and ensuring sustainable prosperity. Monetization reverses this logic: it transforms protection into a tradable good. True economic security requires balancing competing interests, recognizing the leverage of other states, cooperating with partners, and maintaining a long-term strategic horizon.
Balancing Power and Policy
Sound economic security policy depends on managing trade-offs. Actions taken in the name of national security—such as export controls or tariffs—can inadvertently harm innovation and growth, just as pro-growth measures can undermine security if their outcomes are exploited by adversaries. The key is to ensure that reducing one risk does not create a greater one. The early Trump tariffs, sweeping and punitive, destabilized markets and generated widespread uncertainty. More targeted measures, by contrast, can mitigate damage to consumers, producers, and investors while preserving predictability and trust among U.S. allies.
The United States no longer operates in a unipolar environment where it can unilaterally dictate supply chains and economic chokepoints. The more Washington acts as though it can, the more other nations seek to balance against it. Dissatisfaction with U.S. tariff policies has already invigorated alternative frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—an economic-security bloc representing over 40 percent of the world’s population and increasingly positioning itself as a counterweight to U.S. influence in Asia.
A smarter strategy lies in sustained engagement. Building resilient supply chains, protecting data, and enforcing export controls all require coordination with international partners and private industry. Without such cooperation, enforcement weakens and circumvention thrives. Genuine collaboration is not a diplomatic performance but an institutional process: structured dialogue, bureaucratic discipline, and mutual commitment. Through real partnership, the United States can preempt the backlash that undermines its global standing.
Long-Term Security in a Monetized Age
Economic security is inherently a long-term pursuit. Instruments such as export promotion and development assistance take years to bear fruit. Yet many national security professionals mistakenly expect them to deliver immediate, decisive results akin to military action. Destruction is always faster than construction. The transformative potential of economic policy lies precisely in its slow, cumulative effects. Development assistance—often dismissed as charity—is, in reality, a strategic investment in a more stable world.
As America’s security challenges grow increasingly complex, the temptation to treat national security as a market commodity will persist. But one principle must remain inviolable: a democratic government does not enrich itself. National security policy must never be a profit-seeking enterprise. The sole duty of the United States government in this domain is clear and absolute—to ensure the security of the nation. Nothing more, and nothing less.
Sajjad Atazade
Expert, Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS)
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)