In early September of this year, experts from the US Department of Defense presented the draft of the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. This document places a higher priority on domestic and regional missions than on confronting global rivals such as Beijing and Moscow.

For at least the last three presidential terms—that is, since the first Trump administration in 2018 until today—the US National Defense Strategy has consistently defined Beijing and Moscow as threats to US national security, with Beijing as the greatest rival. The new NDS version represents "a major change for the United States and its allies on different continents," and "old and reliable American promises are called into question." The opening clauses of this document state: "It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model."

The NDS is a document typically published at the beginning of each administration, outlining the vision for US actions. Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s head of policymaking, is leading this new strategy. He played a key role in writing the 2018 NDS during the first Trump term, which prioritized deterring China. Colby is a staunch proponent of isolationist policies. Although he has a long history as a "hawk" and a serious opponent of China, he shares the opinion of Vice President J.D. Vance on distancing the United States from foreign commitments.
Although the NDS change may seem inconsistent with Trump's aggressive discourse on China—as he continues to take hardline measures, including imposing staggering tariffs on Beijing and accusing Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin of "conspiring against the United States" after meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at China's (September 3, 2025 Victory Day) military parade—US actions indicate this strategy has already been implemented prior to its official release. These actions include: the large-scale deployment of the National Guard in major cities to support law enforcement, the dispatch of several warships and F-35 fighter jets to the Central American and Caribbean region, counter-narcotics operations on the border with Mexico, and attacks on several Venezuelan boats.

Movements by the Department of State also reinforce this new NDS orientation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio conducted his first foreign trip to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, emphasizing the importance of a sustainable regional strategy and the Trump administration's determination to prioritize Western Hemisphere security. Concurrently, the administration has given special attention to transnational organized crime and large drug cartels, designating them as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). These moves show that the Pentagon and the State Department are in agreement that attention to the Western Hemisphere—particularly its key points, the illicit networks active in the region, and the dynamics of great power competition within the hemisphere—should be at the center of US strategy.

As noted above, the 2025 NDS marks a sharp departure from the two previous strategies of 2018 and 2022. The 2018 NDS replaced "counter-terrorism" with "inter-state strategic competition," or so-called great power competition, as the primary threat to US national security, placing confrontation with China and Russia at the center of US planning. In the 2022 NDS, China was identified as an "immediate challenge" [pacing challenge], and the "review of integrated nuclear and missile defense systems" formed the core of the strategy, with all designs focused on deterring Beijing. Both documents identified the Asia-Pacific region as the arena where US military credibility, and by extension the international order, was being challenged. In contrast, the 2025 NDS draft—although not yet officially published and subject to change by the Secretary of Defense—reverses this logic. According to this strategy, the central point of the national strategy is "Starting from Home and the Western Hemisphere," and "US security commitments outside the Western Hemisphere are a secondary priority unless they directly affect domestic or regional security."

The "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" strategy is based on the fact that "American power and security arise not from abstract global positions but from the density and quality of relationships between actors." Over time, as individuals and institutions interact through trade, remittances, professional associations, academic exchanges, and shared media ecosystems, these relationships become "thicker." The more frequent and closer the interactions, the greater the consequences for both sides of the relationship—namely, the US on one side and the countries of South and Central America on the other.

In the Western Hemisphere, such ties are extremely dense and intertwined. Millions of US residents maintain communication networks with family members across Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Financial channels such as remittances, cross-border banking, and commercial investment reinforce these human connections. This volume and scope of economic, social, and cultural exchange constitutes a productive and stabilizing relationship that builds resilience, fosters innovation, and embeds communities across borders. This very density of networks and ties creates a significant attraction for exploitation, such that the transfer of illicit goods, drugs (fentanyl, etc.), weapons, and laundered money occurs through these same networks.

The 2025 strategy is formulated with the understanding that "security cannot be secured through abstract state-centric relations alone but starts from human interaction and the institutional networks that surround it." The US strategy of "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" in fact reflects the logic that the United States cannot sever the relationships formed among these societies but must manage them. It is, in a way, a recognition of the reality that America's most immediate vulnerabilities stem from the density of these regional relationships.
The United States faces a sharp paradox in the Western Hemisphere: while it is the security guarantor, it is simultaneously most affected by the instability of its peripheral countries. Violence in Central and South America, cartel activity in Mexico, and corruption in Caribbean banking centers are directly reflected in the United States in the form of drug overdoses, illicit firearms flows, cyber-enabled financial crimes, and the empowerment of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). In contrast, tensions in the South China Sea or Eastern Europe, while they may affect the global balance, do not have an immediate effect on the daily lives of Americans. This perception of threat leads to a simple conclusion: "insecurities that are closer matter more." The strategy that emerges from this argument is that "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere is the most practical and sustainable foundation for US security." The 2025 NDS is also in complete alignment with Trump's "America First" and "Make America Great Again" approach.

Consequences of the 2025 "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" Strategy
1. The new strategy does not mean the United States intends to abandon its role as a global actor. Washington will continue to act globally, but under different conditions. The change in the NDS injects realism into security relationships. For decades, the prevailing analysis was that Washington acts to maintain its credibility as a global security guarantor, undertaking and executing security commitments even in distant domains. Now, with the "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" strategy, the United States will define its red lines more carefully, and the criterion for interventions will be their effectiveness in protecting America. In effect, decision-making is not based on an abstract credibility of global power, but on tangible national interests.

2. The "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" strategy does not forget "great power competition" (GPC) but rather redefines it. In this redefinition, the United States will allocate resources more effectively to ensure competition with China and Russia is managed, first and foremost, along the peripheral areas of the Western Hemisphere. Prioritizing the hemisphere is a more realistic and durable approach that minimizes overextension, avoids costly interventions in distant theaters, and preserves national power for the long term. In other words, it transforms GPC from a limitless global competition into a series of controllable actions in regional spaces where US interests are at risk.
3. The "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" strategy indicates that the United States will act more selectively and with greater care in allocating resources outside the hemisphere. The Trump administration has made it clear that all its global interactions will be calculated based on two principles: "America First" and "cost-benefit analysis," rather than on shared interests with European, Asian, or Middle Eastern partners.

4. In the "Starting from Home and the Hemisphere" strategy, US partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific must expect that some security guarantees or assurances, long taken for granted, will no longer be automatically implemented. Instead, they will be re-evaluated against the index of "effectiveness in protecting the homeland." The umbrella of permanent security guarantees, established by post-WWII alliance agreements with the aim of preserving the Status Quo regardless of direct relevance to US security, is no longer considered a certainty. Signs confirm that Washington has already implemented actions in line with this strategy. A Pentagon official and a European diplomat confirmed that the Pentagon will cut funding this year for the Baltic Security Initiative, which provides hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to help build their defense and military infrastructure. NATO allies increasingly expect that a portion of the approximately 80,000 US troops stationed in Europe will be withdrawn in the next few years.

Alireza Ghazili Senior Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies

(Responsibility for the content of this article rests with the author and does not reflect the views of the Center for Political and International Studies.)